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Abstract

Cyberwar challenges future endeavors of state security. As technological
capability has improved, and access to information has become more widespread
the importance of the issue in today's ever-globalizing world grows each day. A
primary objective is to evaluate the place of cyber-warfare against nation-states
and any repercussions under an international law paradigm. Utilizing an English
School perspective, emphasis will be applied to the argument that disruptive
circumstances could come to fruition if international conventions are not created
to bring consensus and order among nation-states on this subject. This study
hypothesizes that a future application could be an agreement under international
law, beyond current regional cooperative initiatives. Since cyber-related attack is
a relatively new development, the issue lacks adequate historical context. In
addition, since state behavior is a major contributor to the interpretation of
international law, the matter is in need of a clear delineation of the norms that
define the phenomena and what acceptable responses might entail. Case study
analysis will highlight recent examples of state behavior and cyber-related
attacks and sabotages.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
An Information Week article states that in 2010, cyber-attacks in U.S.
federal networks rose 39% since a year prior, reporting 41,776 malicious cyber
incidents (Montalbano, 2011). Clarke and Knake claim that, “on average in 2009,
a new type or variant of malware was entering cyberspace every 202 seconds”
(Clarke and Knake, 2010). As technological capability has improved, and access
to information has become more widespread the importance of the issue in
today's ever-globalizing world has become more vital than ever. Cyberwar is an
example of technological advancement that challenges future endeavors of state
security. Cyberwar can be defined as, “actions by a nation-state to penetrate
another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or
disruption” (Clarke and Knake, 2010).

Cyberwar and its relevance in

international security matters continues to be a pivotal issue as technological
opportunity is more accessible to greater numbers of the population.
In addition to briefly exploring types of cyber-attacks for the purposes of
inquiry, I look to answer an important question: Is international law currently
equipped to effectively advise nation-states on the question of cyber-warfare, or
does the issue of cyberwar against nation-states require new norms of
international law?

Emphasis will be given to the argument that disruptive
1

circumstances, worse than those already realized, could come to fruition in
today’s technologically sophisticated times, if international conventions are not
created to bring consensus among nation-states on necessary protections on this
subject. In light of this danger, one could ask if international law might offer an
opportunity for agreement among members of the international community as to
protections from various types of cyberwar and appropriate responses to cyberattacks once they have occurred.
This effort will analyze case studies of various examples of cyber-attack on
nation-states. I analyze the Estonian cyber-attack of 2007, the Russian-Georgian
conflict of 2008, as well as the Stuxnet and Flame infiltrations of Iranian systems
to gain a foundation for further analysis. Case studies of recent cyber-related
incidents among nation-states demonstrate their relevance in today's world
climate and help to identify and categorize cyber-attacks. Case studies, “permit a
deeper understanding of causal processes, the explication of general explanatory
theory, and the development of hypotheses regarding difficult-to-observe
phenomenon” (Johnson, Reynolds and Mycoff, 2008).

This study cannot

reasonably claim to account for every feature of the cyber-attacks in question,
for that is another endeavor entirely.

Rather, the intention is to afford

assessment of the examples to establish classification of the types of attack and
any observable objective in the attempted attack.
This study hypothesizes that a future agreed upon norm could be an
agreement within international law, beyond current regional cooperative
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initiatives. Through case studies, I examine behavior among states regarding
cyber-related attacks and sabotages. I argue that the international community
will be forced to come to consensus on the issue of cyberwar among nationstates, in the form of newly formed norms of international law. Kanuck argues,
“Without any controlling legal authorities for cyber conflicts today, there remains
broad room for maneuver—both diplomatically and militarily” (Kanuck, 2010).
Since state behavior is a major contributor to interpretation of international law,
the lack of consensus leads to the initial conclusion that cyber-related attack is a
relatively new development.

Therefore, the issue lacks adequate historical

context and is in need of a clear delineation of the norms that define the
phenomena and what acceptable responses might entail (retorsion, retaliation,
sanctions).
This direction is not without precedent.

Sofaer and Goodman state,

“Those who support adoption of a multilateral approach to deal with this
quintessentially transnational problem must be encouraged by the fact that
states have consistently adopted multilateral solutions to deal with technologies
that affect populations across national boundaries” (Sofaer and Goodman, 2001).
British Foreign Secretary Hague has called for nations to discuss “norms for state
behavior in cyberspace” (Farnsworth, 2011). Following the documented cyberattack on Estonia of 2007, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
unable to act, lacking a previously agreed upon response to such an incident;
however, at the 20th NATO Summit in 2008 in Bucharest, the group formally
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addressed cyber-attacks (Hathaway, et al. 2012).

Hughes notes that following

the summit, two new NATO divisions were created in order to focus on the threat
of cyber-attacks: The Cyber Defence Management Authority and the Cooperative
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Hughes, 2009). The example of NATO and
its cyber defense initiatives created as a result of the 2008 Bucharest Summit do
not necessarily qualify as a widespread and inclusive endeavor.

Still, it does

highlight the possibility of multilateral cooperation and agreement among states
regarding the issue of cyberwar.

Agreement on application is vague at this

stage, but members continue dialogue on the matter (Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2012). The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which
entered into effect in 2004, includes thirty member states, including the United
States. This treaty was created to allow for interoperability among national laws
and greater cooperation among member states. However, similar to the NATO
initiatives, progress has been slow and direction has lacked focus. Furthermore,
many other states, such as China, Brazil and Russia have not signed it,
undermining its applicability in a practical sense.
In addition to the noted agreements above, the United Nations (UN)
Charter states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security” (Article 51). As it pertains to cyberattack, Benatar shows that a broad interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN
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Charter could lead one to “…demonstrate that cyber-attacks are perhaps not a
new kind of force but instead a new kind of armed force” (Benatar, 2009).
Interestingly, jus ad bellum (the right to war) does not categorize which
weaponry is authorized, and Benatar states that the legality or the question
thereof with regards to cyber force is difficult to ascertain. However, Benatar
(referencing Schmitt, Harrison, Dinniss, Wingfield and Kelsey) does reference the
International Telecommunications Convention, the laws of neutrality, and
international humanitarian law as those norms that may be challenged by the
use of cyber force.
Conversely, some opponents argue against an international convention on
cyber-warfare. These challengers claim that independent and autonomous efforts
on the parts of states should be the main prospect. Any international convention
only serves to limit state opportunity to create its own framework to handle
cyberwar. In addition, there is the question of, “…ambiguities that will prevent
any meaningful international discourse and resolution from taking place” (Muir,
2011). Muir sees the issue strictly from an American perspective, as the world
leader in cyber operations. Muir claims that unilateral action on the part of the
United States is the correct course of action in attaining what he sees as the four
goals for, “…The development of a legal regime around cyber warfare (Muir,
2011):
1) Protect the full panoply of property rights
2) Minimize cyber-attacks and reduce their collateral damage
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3) Deter the use of proxies in the commission of cyber-attacks
4) Provide legal recourse for aggrieved parties”
Muir’s argument for the disadvantageousness to the United States of an
international agreement, calling for the unilateral action on the part of the United
States to attain the above goals clearly falls in the classical realist camp.
However, enlightened realists could argue that it may be in the best interests of
the state to enter into international agreements on cyber-warfare. The realist
perspective will be briefly described later in this paper.
Conversely, some argue that the issue of cyberwar is not a relevant issue.
Rid argues that cyberwar is not a separate threat at all. He claims that cyberwar
is simply, “sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare
itself: subversion, espionage and sabotage” (Rid, 2012). Citing Clausewitz on
“the most concise concept of war,” Rid claims that past cyber-attacks do not
meet the criteria of an act of war: violent character, instrumentality as a means
to an end and political nature.

Rid does not believe that there will be any

comparatively large-scale event on the scale of the Hiroshima attack or the Pearl
Harbor attack of World War II, and to compare cyberwar to nuclear war is
“misplaced and problematic” (Rid, 2012). I argue that Rid is in the marginal
perspective and his argument a naïve view of the issue.
Others will find Rid in the minority. They argue that as the nations of the
world continue to mature in their technological advances, the progression leads
to reliance on these capabilities. Critical infrastructures can come under extreme
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duress, and “it is easy to imagine far more momentous and malicious information
attacks that, by disabling infrastructures or causing them to malfunction, could
impose economic hardship on citizens, physically harm them, impair military
operations, or undermine confidence in global and national financial and
commodities markets by introducing erroneous information” (Grove, Goodman
and Lukasik, 2000).
processing

equipment,

The authors argue that access to cheap computer
greater

network

speeds

and

the

increasing

interdependency of infrastructures only exacerbate the inevitability and
magnitude of such possibilities.

They propose active defenses through the

imposition of penalties under international law and making failure an expensive
proposition, such as damaging the attacking equipment. Active defense systems
may be useful in the protection of infrastructure elements, such as nuclear power
plants. By extension, the authors also argue that, “Interpretations of the UN
Charter and of the laws of armed combat will have to evolve accordingly in order
to accommodate the novel definitions of the use of force that such attacks imply”
(Grove, Goodman and Lukasik, 2000).

The end result is the potentiality for

consensus and establishing legal standards on this rapidly escalating issue. Such
consensus is pivotal for international law to offer any guidance.
Kanuck points to the 1990s as the decade in which “efforts to analyze
‘information warfare’ under international law” took shape (Kanuck, 2010). He
argues that states try to “exercise their sovereignty over cyberspace” (Kanuck,
2010). The challenge of cyberspace to the conception of physical boundaries
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that is so endemic to international law makes the effort to exercise sovereignty a
unique undertaking. It is not simply a question of state government influence,
but also that of private companies and sometimes a combination of the two
entities. Kanuck states, “Once one appreciates that governments seek to extend
their sovereign authority into this new realm, it then becomes necessary to
analyze how their interests may align or conflict in regard to nonexclusive
resources” (Kanuck, 2010).

Therefore, Kanuck argues in favor of collective

standards where unilateral action is not the answer.
Hollis reasons for these norms, claiming that attribution is a great
challenge. Hollis states, “I argue that international law needs a new norm for
cybersecurity: a duty to assist or DTA” (Hollis, 2011). Utilizing the classic “SOS”
maritime idea, this line of reasoning removes the burden of attribution, elevating
the need to mitigate harm.

If norms existed that could help regulate cyber

threats through a collectively agreed upon duty to assist, attackers may be
deterred from trying in the first place.
As stated previously, the study intends to argue for the importance of
international law in addressing future responses to cyberwar. Theoretically, this
line of reasoning would incorporate liberal ideals. Cooperation, rather than direct
competition or confrontation as seen from the perspective of the realist camp,
would be the protocol used to respond to the issue of cyberwar. However, it
should be noted that states do indeed participate in an anarchical arrangement.
Still, this arrangement also includes the fact that states recognize their shared
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interests in many areas to promote cooperation, or at least follow a set of norms
that maintains peaceful patterns of behavior.
In response to the background noted above, an English School perspective
will be used in this line of inquiry. The English School stresses the idea of an
international society as the object of analysis (Linklater, 2009). Scholars such as
Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and more recently, Nicholas Wheeler and Barry Buzan
are seen as influential English School thinkers. The English School could be best
understood as a middle-ground between liberalism and realism. On one hand,
the English School sees the international system as more civil than realists care
to acknowledge. Conversely, the English School sees that conflict can and does
occur in an international society, “at odds with utopians who believe in the
possibility of perpetual peace” (Linklater, 2009). Indeed, “For Martin Wight, the
theory of international society represents an alternative to realism and idealism
in the study of international relations” (Griffiths, Roach and Solomon, 2009). To
argue further,

“Bull claims that the 'institutions' of the society of states (war,

great powers, maneuvers, international law, diplomacy and the balance of
power) are crucial in maintaining international order” (Griffiths, Roach and
Solomon, 2009).

International law aims to perpetuate orderly international

relationships in an effort to create a foundation based on customary norms of
behavior.

This would help limit the potential for escalating tensions among

states.
Nations that find that their interests do not align with a peaceful course of
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action or do not wish to cooperate or dialogue, may flout norms set forth among
states in an international society. That would indeed fall within the theorization
of an anarchical system. It could be argued that a recent proclaimed unilateral
response on the part of the United States in response to an attack on its
informational infrastructure would qualify as a response that the realist would
certainly see as rational.
demonstrate

potential

However, the intention of this research is to

agreement

and

consensus,

and

argue

that

the

international community must acquiesce to dialogue and cooperation in this
instance.
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Chapter Two:
Realism, Liberalism and the English School: Competing Perspectives on
International Law
Realism and liberalism, two of the great tenets of International Relations
scholarship, resonate from opposite ends of the IR field. On one hand, realism
places emphasis on the anarchical affairs of states, in that there is no power that
oversees states in their quests for what is in their self-interests. As a result, a
self-help system permeates the international climate.

Conversely, liberalism

highlights

states,

progressiveness

competition.

and

cooperation

among

rather

than

With this understanding, how do the competing sides see

international law? How do the perspectives see international law with respect to
states in a cyber-world?

Realism
Realism and its more recent iteration, neo-realism, counts among its
advocates Thomas Hobbes, Niccolo Machiavelli, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth
Waltz. These visionaries of Real Politik claimed that the world is governed not by
some international authority, but by power and the continuous struggle to attain
it. The solitary end lies in securing one’s self-interest. In this case, the “one” is
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the State, and the State is the highest authority among many competing
authorities. Realists agree that the product of such an arrangement is anarchy.
This conception of anarchy is not to be confused with utter chaos, but is simply a
situation without any single entity having absolute authority over a plethora of
agents (states).

In addition to this lack of governable authority over states,

realism claims that the previously mentioned aspect of self-interest is what drives
states towards their ends. In being selfish, a state looks out for itself, and as
Waltz suggests, “puts itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no
one else can be counted on to do so” (Waltz, 1979). It has also been argued
that morality itself is not to be an aim of the state. By extension, states should
also not be measured in terms of their morality.

Morgenthau declares, “The

actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments
but by considerations of interest and power” (Morgenthau, 1970).
Where does this leave the realist perspective as it relates to the concept of
international law, and more specifically cyberwar under an international
normative regime?

Waltz and Morgenthau clearly argue on behalf of a

perspective that does not sympathize with pursuing moral objectives as an end in
themselves.

Russell notes, “Unlike the solitary individual who may claim the

right to judge political action by universal ethical guidelines, the statesman will
always make his decision on the basis of the state’s interest” (as cited in
Donnelly, 2000).

Further, Schwarzenberger emphasizes that international

morality, like international law, “is both subservient to power politics
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and…ﬂourishes best where it does not interfere with the international struggle
for power” (as cited in Donnelly, 2000). Carr argues that, “no ethical standards
are applicable to relations between states” (as cited in Donnelly, 2000).
Morgenthau agrees, “…universal moral principles cannot be applied to the
actions of states” (as cited in Donnelly, 2000). Under these pretenses, it would
be short-sighted to ask one of the realist perspective to even consider following
normative rules, unless those rules align with their perceived self-interest. Rules
are not in the best interests of a state that can otherwise exercise power to
achieve its aims.

As it relates to cyber-warfare, any international convention

limiting or prohibiting such cyber activities on the part of a state could possibly
be seen as inconsequential and therefore illogical to follow. Other enlightened
realists could argue that it may be in the best interests of the state to enter into
international agreements on cyber-warfare. States operating under the realist
perspective would follow what is in their best interests and circumvent or follow
any international agreements, if they deem that to be the course of action to
take.
Conversely, Carr argues, “it is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the
element of morality in any world order” (as cited in Donnelly, 2000). Also, “…the
rules of international law constitute treaties, which by making possible the
creation of international obligations respond to one of the most serious
deﬁciencies of Hobbesian anarchy…and regulative institutions of various sorts can
substantially alter the interactions of even powerful states.” (Donnelly, 2000)
13

This particular statement questions a great assumption found in realism: that
the international landscape is one made up of an anarchical arrangement with no
oversight over the states involved. The constraints and obligations found within
an international society such as those of treaties found in international law
indicate that there are behaviors that states are willing to agree on. Treaties
may help inhibit powerful states from acting in a manner that is unacceptable to
other parties under the agreement.

Such inhibition hardly lines up with an

entirely anarchical arrangement.

Liberalism
Another great pillar of International Relations theory is liberalism, which
“emphasizes individual rights, constitutionalism, democracy and limitations on
the powers of the state” (Burchill, 2009). Liberalism includes such supporters as
Karl Deutsch, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Keohane, and Michael Doyle. Contrary
to the outside-in approach of realism, Fukuyama argues for an inside-out
approach. Fukuyama notes that domestic, internal political orders with liberaldemocratic ideals are seen as the vehicle to end international conflict (Burchill,
2009). Indeed, liberalism finds the liberal-democratic world to be in a zone of
peace, rather than conflict.

Fukuyama claims, “a world made up of liberal

democracies…should have much less incentive for war, since all nations would
reciprocally recognize one another’s legitimacy” (Fukuyama, 1992).
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Liberalism does not acknowledge the concept of a “zero-sum” game in the
way realism does. Herz states that, “the mitigation, channeling, balancing, or
control of power has prevailed perhaps more often than the inevitability of power
politics would leave one to believe”

(as cited in Donnelly, 2000).

Burchill

elaborates: “Mutual benefits arising out of cooperation are possible because
states are not always preoccupied with relative gains – hence the opportunities
for constructing regimes around issues and areas of common concern” (Burchill,
2009).

Keohane and Nye also note that states, as members of international

institutions can broaden their conception of their self-interests to better cultivate
potential cooperation. Further, Keohane and Nye argue that fulfilling obligations
of these international organizations can limit the pursuits of national interest,
thereby subverting the “meaning and appeal of state sovereignty” (as cited in
Burchill, 2009).
The defenders of the liberal mindset are also met with challenges.
Globalization offers a great example of such a challenge. Hobsbawm claims that
three areas of state authority have been limited by globalization:

state

monopolies of coercion by force, loyalty to the state from its citizens and finally,
government capacity to supply public services due to liberal market forces.
Overall, Hobsbawm notes: “The state as an essential unit of liberal democracy is
weakening while public antipathy to globalization grows” (as cited in Burchill,
2009).
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Where does this leave the liberal perspective as it relates to cyberwar
under the auspices of international law? Is the weakening of state interference
in the face of market liberalization necessarily a good thing, as lobbied for by
liberalism?

Can the market be relied upon for solutions to international

problems? One could argue that liberalism does not offer an effective alternative
to realism, because state authority has been weakened through globalization.
This weakness perpetuates challenges to state sovereignty, and thereby
participation under an international law paradigm.

Some may defend liberal

internationalism in its advocacy for democracy, free trade and essential human
rights.
Realists could counter the weakening of state sovereignty as argued by
Keohane and Nye with the important observation that only states may act as
agents which may influence international law. The state, as an agent under the
scope of international law, is subjugated to a multiplicity of globalizing forces
outside its control.

Nevertheless, while these external forces threaten its

sovereignty, the state still has not had any serious competitor to its status as the
primary unit of analysis.

International law is in place to afford states a

framework for the stability of relations amongst one another. Cooperation, as a
noted cornerstone to the liberalist mindset, undermines any need for such a
framework to even exist. Therefore, this framework of stability indicates that
cooperation is not enough to allow states to peacefully concur on issues of
pivotal importance. Indeed, cooperative initiatives have been constructed, such
16

as The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime among others. However, the central
idea in this thesis calling for international law to bring consensus on the issue of
cyber-warfare supports the notion that minimal efforts at cooperation and
unregulated market liberalization alone do not offer sufficient solutions to this
global phenomenon.
This chapter has briefly described both realist and liberal perspectives, and
the polarized nature of their positions as two of the great creeds of International
Relations scholarship. With the understanding noted earlier, the competing sides
see international law with respect to states in a cyber-world in very different
views.

Realism does not sympathize with a system of normative rules and

customs by which states are to be bound. The idea directly contrasts with the
self-help system that realism extols. Liberalism takes the opposite approach, in
that international institutions may offer an arrangement where international
obligations offer great opportunity for cooperation, but at the cost of potentially
subverting national sovereignty. Market liberalization could weaken the state’s
ability to act as an authority, particularly when market forces undermine state
ability to provide services to citizens that may already have shaky loyalty. In a
liberal world of blurring borders, power becomes less tangible, whereas realism
has been much more assured in where power rests. It has also already been
noted that institutions such as international law and the United Nations only
recognize states as agents, thereby reasserting the importance of the state.
With these ideas in mind, another hybrid perspective is available which
17

offers the understanding of an anarchical arrangement of states and power seen
in realism, merged with a greater perceived propensity for normative behavior
and cooperation among nations found in liberalism, without challenging state
sovereignty. The expectation from an international community of states of its
individual members allows for customs to emerge, which is a main facet to
international law.

International law creates an environment where states are

expected to act in a manner consistent with rules agreed upon by its members.
Such an international society made up of sovereign entities is the foundation for
the English School theory of international relations.

The English School
The English School offers a perspective that may be seen as a “middle
ground” to those competing ideals of the realist and liberal camps. The term via

media is frequently utilized in English School theory, referring to this “middle
ground.” Indeed, one could see the English School as the proverbial synthesis to
realism’s thesis and liberalism’s antithesis.

Linklater summarizes the English

School: “The foundational claim of the English School is that sovereign states
form a society, but an anarchic one since they do not have to submit to a higher
power…members of the English School are attracted by elements of realism and
idealism, yet gravitate towards the middle ground, never wholly reconciling
themselves to either point of view” (Linklater, 2009).

The English School

emphasizes the lack of an overarching government in the international society.
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In essence, the English School argues that the international system is more civil
than realists would care to admit.
Bull claims such sociability among nations exists, “through their sense of
shared interests and values, through their obedience to rules of international law,
and through their participation in international institutions to regulate the
conduct of international actors” (as cited in Keene, 2009). By extension, they
find the notion of perpetual peace utopian and naïve. Principally, the English
School and its proponents look to better understand the, “processes that
transform systems of states into societies of states and in the norms and
institutions that prevent the collapse of civility and the emergence of unbridled
power” (Linklater, 2009). Linklater’s point with respect to “unbridled power” as it
relates to the English School’s attempts to mitigate it within a society of states is
important. The English School challenges the tenet of power found in realism,
such as Muir’s previous assertion of unilateral action on the part of the United
States to achieve what he believes an international convention cannot. However,
it is also important to note that the state is still the primary actor in an
international society of states, and therefore challenges the liberalist perspective.
Wight alludes to the “Grotian Tradition” (as cited in Linklater, 2009), where
the English School can trace its beginnings. During a time of conflict between
Catholics and Protestants, Hugo Grotius imagined an international society which
would promote coexistence. In fact, Wight himself “lamented the way in which
debates between realism and utopianism…had neglected the via media with its
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distinctive focus on international society” (Linklater, 2009).

Bull concurs with

respect to the importance of an international society, stating that it was up to,
“intelligent and sensitive persons” to take visions of “a world society or
community” seriously (as cited in Linklater, 2009). One of the visionaries of the
English School, Hedley Bull has been a proponent of the international society
found in an otherwise anarchical environment. After all, anarchy is, “what states
make of it” (Wendt, 1992).
Wilson notes that, “One of the deﬁning features of the English School is
the emphasis it places on normative rules, and in particular the rules of
international law” (Wilson, 2009). Wilson also cites James: “For members of the
English School, international law ‘stands at the very centre of the international
society’s normative framework’” (as cited in Wilson, 2009).

The contrast to the

realist perspective is distinguished: “…it should be seen as a body of rules,
deemed by those to whom it applies as binding, the purpose of which is to
facilitate regular, continuous, and generally orderly international relationships”
(Wilson, 2009). Wilson is explaining the emphasis placed on an international
society by English School scholars, and that normative rules govern behavior of
states. Inferred is the need for these rules to govern behaviors of otherwise
competitive states in an anarchical arrangement.

The English School

understands the anarchical arrangement and attempts to create an environment
where states are recognized as individuals with notable positions on issues. By
granting a voice to each member of the community, and with each voice equal in
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weight, states may better understand what is acceptable versus not acceptable.
States are also made aware of possible responses to activities based on
customary practices.

Adding such expectations to the proceedings, “helps

reduce the degree of unpredictability in international affairs…Sense can thus only
be made of international law by making sense of international society” (Wilson,
2009). Mayall agrees regarding international law, noting it is “the bedrock
institution on which the idea of international society stands or fall” (Mayall,
2000).
English School scholars are at odds with realists and neo-realists with
respect to the question of legitimacy. This is due to realism’s lack of emphasis
on the difficulties of legitimacy internal to the state as well as the international
legitimacy among nations. Bull argued that safeguarding national sovereignty
would allow nations comfort in the notion that they may promote whichever
internal policies they wish, while still being recognized as legitimate in the eyes
of other states (Linklater, 2009).

On the other hand, the question of order

versus justice is of high concern in the English School, and it leaves the theory
with a quandary. The international order of things is agreeable among nations,
as the question of sovereignty has been effectively assuaged, but the sense of
justice is in the eyes of the beholder.
This wavering idea of justice can be explained by the example of human
rights, and its somewhat metamorphic definition which is dependent upon whom
you ask.

Bull argues that, “the long-term trend over recent decades has
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favoured the introduction of solidarist measures to promote the international
protection of human rights (as cited in Linklater, 2009).

When Bull refers to

“solidarist” measures, he denotes the rights of the individual and calling for
greater cooperation and consensus of a greater range of issues among states
more consistent with the liberal perspective.

In contrast and sympathetic to

realism, pluralism refers to the above discussed question of sovereignty and the
lack of intervention and cooperation on the part of the international society
members.

This does not necessarily lessen the importance of sovereignty

however, though members are to mutually recognize each other as equals: a
precondition for international law. In the case of human rights, the solidarist
perspective, as argued by Vincent can qualify the basic fundamental human right
to be free from starvation.

While extreme differences over negative versus

positive human rights claims may exist, almost all can agree that global attention
to malnutrition can lead to action among all of humanity (as cited in Linklater,
2009). The question of order (most often a Western ideal) and justice (nonWestern in general) can become moot, as solidarity on issues such as Human
Rights becomes the norm. By extension, international law can be the vehicle
used to create consensus on such important matters, as exhibited by the
International Declaration of Human Rights.
As discussed above, the English School offers a perspective that harnesses
the ideals of an international society of states, including a perpetuation of
international law which governs state behavior. An order emerges, and norms
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are found to mitigate international capriciousness. While such fickle behavior
among states is simply lessened and not entirely eliminated, international law
serves to enhance the order among states and to an extent, impart a sense of
justice among members.

International law brings legitimacy to nations who

contribute to order amongst the anarchy. Against the backdrop of international
cooperation with the question of state interests included amongst the dynamic
world of international relations, international law indeed offers consensus as to
how states ought to behave.

It is in this environment, where international

consensus on important matters has been observed.

Examples such as the

International Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, among others are noted in this
regard. With this foundation for international law in place, the question of cyberwarfare can be better evaluated as to whether it is even reasonable to consider
the issue relevant to international relations and international law.
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Chapter Three:
Classifying Cyber-Attacks
Shifting in direction from the theoretical line of inquiry, it is now important
to describe cyber-attacks. Later in this work, I will show what a cyber-attack is
capable of in recent case studies. The present question is how can such activity
accomplish such grand ends? What kinds of cyber-attack exist today, and what
do they look to achieve?

While entire volumes of intellectual findings are

available on this topic alone, I look to very briefly explain cyber-attack methods
used today in order to garner a general level of understanding. This helps the
reader to better grasp the threats involved in this area as well as create a
foundation for inquiry.

Defining Cyberwar
Some confusion exists in defining cyberwar. Azarov and Dodonov state
that, “…in spite of the fact that terms information war, netwar, and cyberwar
have distinctions in problem areas, all of them are frequently used in parallel with
the purpose of adaptation in mass consciousness of various social layers – from
government officials to the general public” (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006).

In

short, the interchanging usage of these terms exists so that general audiences
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may garner a familiarity with the issues inherent to the discussion. As mentioned
previously, for the purposes of this thesis, former Special Advisor on Cybersecurity under President G.W. Bush, Richard A. Clarke defines cyberwar as,
“…actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks
for the purposes of causing damage or disruption” (Clarke and Knake, 2010).
The method of the attack, an example of which is the Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) designed to disrupt operations on a grand scale, is simply the
means of the attack.

To clarify types of cyber-attack, it is important to

understand the scale of these attacks, and what objective is to be attained.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt mention, “…when we think about ‘cyber’, we need to
reflect on the Greek root – ‘kybernan’, which means to control or to govern”
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997). Therefore, a cyber-attack is an attack meant to
control or govern. This surmises that the end result is not necessarily to destroy.
Azarov and Dodonov agree: “…the purpose of cyberwar is not destruction but
control interception of information resources, systems and channels, which can
be formally expressed as a process of changing of adversary control vectors
according to the attacker’s reference vectors…the modern information systems in
cyberspace will be attacked with purposes not only for the destruction of
information in the adversary information infrastructure but also for the control
interception” (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006).
For further description, Azarov and Dodonov note that the Department of
Defense has defined an information system as, “the entire infrastructure,
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organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit,
display, disseminate, and act on information.” More recently, Joint Publication 102 defines this term as ‘the organized collection, processing, transmission, and
dissemination of information, in accordance with defined procedures, whether
automated or manual” (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006).
To summarize the initial description of a cyber-attack in more conventional
terms, a cyber-attack is an attempt to acquire control or govern information
systems. These information systems act upon information in such a manner as
to make it accessible, such as with power grids and other end products of that
information. To control or govern the information not only affects the security of
the information, but what can be accomplished with that information. Systems
that could come under cyber-attack include electrical and telecommunications
infrastructure or automatons, traffic and air control systems, nuclear power,
defense systems, private information systems, and so on.
Cyber-attacks are capable of a wide range of ends.

At times, the

endeavor is simply espionage, such as the Flame cyber-attack discovered in 2012
in Iran, to be discussed later in Chapter Four.

At other times the goal is

governing the accessibility to that information or controlling or disrupting entire
systems as in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. Other invasions may look to
undermine information in an effort to sabotage or even to perhaps destroy not
only information, but the application of information manifested in physical, “realworld” systems. The Stuxnet infiltration in 2010 was an example of a cyber-
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attack that destroyed physical assets in Iran used to enrich Uranium, tied directly
to the nuclear facility at Natanz. This example will also be analyzed in Chapter
Four.

Types of Cyber-Attack
Many types of cyber-attack are at the disposal of the cyber-warrior.
Therefore, a valuable effort in the analysis of cyberwar should include a general
account of the options available in their arsenal. A brief description of notable
forms of cyber-attack follows to grant the reader a foundation for further
exploration of the matter.
Botnets. The botnet form of cyber-attack comes from the comingling of
the term, “robot network”. A botnet is defined as, “[a] network of Internetconnected end-user computing devices infected with bot malware, which are
remotely controlled by third parties for nefarious purposes. A botnet is under the
control of a given "botherder" or "botmaster." A botnet might have just a handful
of botted hosts, or millions” (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2012).
Botnets can be used in a large-scale operation in the sense that an attacking
entity can conscript a multitude of computers without the typical user having any
knowledge of their computer’s supplementary cause or even of its subversion.
Botnets can use their unwitting mediums to supervise the dissemination of
Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS), which I will cover shortly, acquire
sensitive information from those participating computers as well as multiply itself
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amongst other unprotected computers. During the cyber-attack that afflicted the
nation of Georgia in 2008 (described in the next chapter), botnets were used to
bolster the scope of the Distributed Denial of Service attacks which crippled
government websites and other information outlets.
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks refer to, “[t]he prevention of authorized
access to resources or the delaying of time-critical operations” (U.S. Department
of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004). By using
up all the resources available for the network, system or applications in question,
the attacker can limit or even prohibit the usage of the above, effectively
bringing operations to a standstill until resolved. Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks are simply DoS attacks, but on a grand scale with the usage of
botnets or worms (which will also be discussed shortly). DDoS is the preferred
vehicle among attackers because of its sheer scope which allows for the
opportunity to bring down an entire network or website by flooding the target
system with an overwhelming amount of incoming network traffic (IT Law Wiki,
2012).
In addition, although the attack can be traced to a multitude of sources
across many countries, most are unwitting agents who are unaware that they are
involved. This allows for plausible deniability. An applicable example of use of
DoS or DDoS is the Denial of Service attack brought down Kyrgyzstan’s main
internet servers and email capability on January 18, 2009. Coincidentally, this
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occurred the same day as Russian public pressure on Kyrgyzstan to stop U.S. use
of an airbase, located at Bishkek (Ashmore, 2009). The DDoS was traced back
to Russia, but this does not necessarily mean that this is Russian interference.
Logic Bombs. Logic Bombs are, “…in programming, a form of sabotage
in which a programmer inserts code that causes the program to perform a
destructive action when some triggering event occurs…”
Accounting Office, 2004).

(U.S. General

If an event occurs which prompts the malicious

computer code to commence, the immediate results are realized in the form of
data being compromised. Usually, a Logic Bomb is used to destroy data or at
least render the data meaningless or unusable. An attacker wanting to “cover
his tracks’ could use a Logic Bomb to undermine the implicating data elements
through this scrambling or destruction of the evidence.

Logic Bombs can

sometimes even be used to render hardware inoperable thereby compromising
the attached elements of a system. On a small scale, this type of attack could be
used by a disgruntled employee to erase data used on company servers. In a
more relevant example, China could implant Logic Bombs on the military
informational infrastructure used by the United States, which would cripple
American capabilities militarily during a conflict (Clarke and Knake, 2010).
Trojan Horses. A relative of the Logic Bomb, the Trojan horse cyberattack is a, “computer program that conceals harmful code.

A Trojan horse

usually masquerades as a useful program that a user would wish to execute”
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004). Once the Trojan has been executed, its
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ulterior motive is revealed, which was built by the attacker. Indeed, in the realm
of cyber-attack it is equivalent to self-sabotage. Many times, Trojan horses are
opportunities for attackers to gain “back door” access not previously available to
a system via an authorized user.
Using the previous example of Chinese asymmetrical warfare using cyberattacks can explain the use of a Trojan. Modernizing a network with greater
safeguards, such as the use of a more robust Intrusion Detection and Protection
System (IDPS) is common for security experts to block incoming attacks.
However, if a Trojan were to get onto the system prior to the installation of an
IPS, it may appear as an authorized entry. Thus, a back door has been planted;
an access point where infiltrators may plant such things as Logic Bombs,
circumventing the protections is now in place.
Viruses. Viruses are similar to Trojan horses in their malicious intent, but
are actually applications themselves.

In addition, viruses can propagate with

inadvertent (or advertent) human action, such as opening emails that include the
virus or sharing infected files. To elaborate, a virus is “a program that ‘infects’
computer files, usually executable programs, by inserting a copy of itself into the
file. These copies are usually executed when the ‘infected’ file is loaded into
memory, allowing the virus to infect other files” (U.S. General Accounting Office,
2004).
The application of viruses can range anywhere from simple day-to-day
computer operations (the ILOVEYOU virus in 2000), to the use on nation-states.
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They can also range in their intentions from destruction to espionage.

The

“Flame” virus that will be analyzed later was used as an espionage tool in Iran.
Inadvertent usage of infected files allowed the virus to spread, allowing for the
designers of the virus access to information located on Iranian networks as well
as the networks themselves.
Worms.

Worms denote an, “independent computer program that

reproduces by copying itself from one system to another across a network” (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 2004).

The main difference between worms and

viruses are worms’ capability to self-propagate. Generally, worms are used to
drain resources on network systems, create “back door” accessibility, perform
DDoS attacks, and other various aims.

While the self-propagation capability

sounds ominous, this is indeed limited to network connectivity.

Therefore,

localization through disconnection from any network concentrates the worm to a
location, unable to spread.
Containment is attainable, but if a worm is not known to exist, it is free to
propagate at will. The example of “Stuxnet” (noted later) is a very appropriate
explanation of what a worm is capable of. The use of Stuxnet spread beyond its
intended scope by its designers. However, its initial use was to establish control
within a system, allowing a different set of parameters to be followed based on
what the worm designers had established. Once the worm had spread beyond
its initial scope, the requirements imbedded in the worm code were not met, and
therefore, the control interception beyond the initial scope was rendered largely
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harmless.

Examples of Cyber-Attack Usage
Cyber-attacks made up of the preceding methods are capable of a widerange of control. Clarke and Knake utilize clever anecdotes to grant the reader
an example of what such control can achieve. Details are sketchy on exactly
what kinds of cyber-attacks were used and when these events occurred, but that
does not lessen their practical importance, particularly given that the examples
come from the former Special Advisor on Cyber-security under President George
W. Bush (Clarke and Knake, 2010).
Looking back at the Second War in Iraq, Clarke and Knake describe the
situation in Iraq prior to the conventional attack, where the United States had
infiltrated the supposedly “closed-loop” military network.

A “closed loop”

network refers to a network that operates disconnected from outside influences
could invade the information system.
Many Iraqi military officers had received emails of the sort that advised
them of a course of action (most notably, do not participate and you will be
reconstituted once the regime has been replaced). The emails intimated that
these actions that would supposedly save them from the impending American
onslaught (Clarke and Knake, 2010). The authors can speculate on what was
actually in the emails, but the tool of information in the cyber-warrior’s hands
and the opportunity to disseminate that information as one chooses can be a
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powerful combination to face.
Another example Clarke and Knake cite is the event where Israel had
“owned” the air-defense network of Syria, and attacked one of their nuclear
facilities. In essence, the Israelis utilized a pseudo-cloaking device, replacing the
air defense signals that Syria should have noticed (incoming Israeli planes), with
a signal of silence (meant to signify peaceful skies to the observers) (Clarke and
Knake, 2010). Through the undermining of the air defense information system
Syria could have used to monitor their airspace and protect their closely guarded
nuclear facility, Israel was able to violate Syrian airspace, and knock out what
Israel perceived to be a potential threat.
A military incursion of another nation’s air space could be construed as a
violation of the sovereignty of that state, and a pretext to war. However, without
evidence to support the assertion of an invasion on the part of Israel, save for
perhaps obvious motives, denial on the part of Israel is all that would be needed
to avert a local or regional crisis. After all, the intrusion was not even caught by
Syria’s first-alert air defense systems, and could have been interpreted as an
accident at the site itself. Other reasons for Syria’s silence on the matter may
also exist, but without evidence, confirmation of the identity of Israeli military
craft in Syrian airspace was unavailable.
These scenarios are not the product of an overactive imagination. These
are real-world applications of where the commandeering of a nation’s information
system, in these cases military and defense related, and the scope of such
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intrusion is not left to simply military application.

Civilian entities are also

potential targets of cyber-attack, such as the informational or resource
infrastructure within a state. Infiltration of a networked power grid could cripple
a state financially and logistically if sabotage of the system were to be controlled,
or worse, brought down.

Schmitt states, “…because of the potentially grave

impact of CNA on a state’s infrastructure, it can prove a high gain, low risk option
for a state outclassed militarily or economically (Schmitt, 1999).

It is therefore

important to analyze historical examples of such cyber-attacks on nations.
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Chapter Four:
Case Studies
With the relative youth of the practice of cyberwar, case studies are
difficult to establish.

The lack of concrete examples in which nations have

participated in cyber-attacks on another nation exacerbates this task.

This

difficulty is augmented by the challenge of attributing cyber-attacks to a
particular state. Inevitably, hacking agents and “cyber-warriors” utilize various
tools to mask their identities as well as insulate themselves from their sponsors.
Attempts to link the origination of cyber-attacks to the main force behind the
attack are sometimes an almost insurmountable job. However, some incidents
have been noted that have directly affected state operations.

With a basic

understanding of what cyber-attacks are available in the cyber-warrior’s arsenal,
we can examine cases that better help us understand what occurred.
These case studies are described in order to better equip the reader with
a sense of the practical importance of cyberwar against states. I analyze recent
cyber-attacks on states, all within the last five years. In these cases, I look for
suspicion of state involvement in the attack, and if that suspicion became more
substantial based on findings.

In essence, these examples were chosen for

analysis because of their potential for implicating nation-states. I also look to
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understand the intended effects of the cyber-attack, and who or what those
effects were meant to target.
As mentioned previously, the following case studies will be covered briefly:
the Estonian Cyber-Attack of 2007 and the Georgian Cyber-Attack of 2008 during
their conflict with Russia. Also, the Stuxnet worm of 2009 and the Flame virus
that was uncovered in 2012 involving Iran and its nuclear centrifuges at the
Natanz complex will merit attention.

Estonian Cyber-Attack of 2007
The cyber-attack that afflicted the tiny nation of Estonia in 2007 is widely
regarded as the world’s first cyber-attack that left the national security of a state
in the balance (Beidleman, 2011).

According to Beidleman, “botnets…seized

more than a million computers from 75 countries and directed them to barrage
targets in Estonia” (Beidleman, 2011). The botnets utilized distributed denial of
service attacks to flood information requests onto websites associated with the
government, the banking sector and other important essentials of Estonian life.
Such devastating information overload delivered by the distributed denial of
service attacks crippled all Estonian informational infrastructure elements that
were associated with everyday use of internet.

Automated Teller Machines

(ATMs) no longer dispensed currency. Vandalism of websites also occurred. The
news media was incapable of offering citizens any updates.
Ashmore notes that the Estonians were able to respond effectively, limiting
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the effects to short-term outages. Further, there were no permanent damages
inflicted to the informational infrastructure (Ashmore, 2009).

Estonia

successfully employed its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and
comingled efforts between government and civilian experts mitigated the
potential for disaster.

Alexander Ntok, head of Corporate Strategy at the

International Telecommunication Union (ITU) lauds the Estonian responses and
recovery efforts: “it was imaginative responses that allowed Estonia to emerge
from the spring cyber-attack relatively unscathed” (as cited in Ashmore, 2009).
In fact, Ashmore finds Estonia in a leadership role as it pertains to NATO
Information Technology structural defense.

Estonia has also provided expert

personnel to staff the NATO Cyber Defence Centre in Tallinn upon its opening in
May 2008 (as cited in Ashmore, 2009).
Estonia also has looked to bolster the international legal agenda to
enhance laws to protect Information Technology infrastructures. According to
the Estonian Ministry of Defense, Estonia has worked to increase international
cooperation to protect global systems (as cited in Ashmore, 2009). In addition,
during Estonia’s response to the attack, the CERT for Estonia issued an
international appeal for assistance among specialists and firms from around the
world (Jenik, 2009).
While Estonia’s response to an otherwise ground-breaking problem in
state security has been extoled, the questions arise: why was the response
necessary and who was answerable to the breach?
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Many have speculated that because of the identification of Russian
internet protocol (IP) addresses used in the attack, the culpability lies with
Russia. Further, tensions at that time between ethnic Russians living in Estonia
and the nation itself were peaking due to Estonian aims to move a statue in
place to celebrate Soviet casualties during World War II. Russians have
celebrated victory in World War II on May 9, and according to the Permanent
Under-Secretary of State for the Estonian Ministry of Defence, Lauri Almann,
“The idea was to have a huge gathering on 9 May that was combined with a
huge cyber-attack” (Mansfield-Devine, 2012). Paramilitary groups, such as the
Russian Business Network have been found to be involved in the cyber-attack (as
well as in the Georgian cyber-attack in 2008).

Gervais finds that, “the

relationship between the Russian Business Network and the Russian State should
be sufficient to impute state responsibility” (Gervais, 2012).

In addition, the

Russian government offered no cooperation in tracking down the botnets and
their origination and Estonian requests for bilateral investigation under the
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) were denied by Russia (Shackelford,
2009).
Even with the smoking gun and a potential motive available, the extent of
Russian guilt in this instance has not been ascertained. However, other cyberattacks in former Soviet satellites have occurred in Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan and
Georgia (to be discussed shortly).

In these cases, allegations of Russian

involvement have been voluble (Ashmore, 2009).
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Georgian Cyber-Attack of 2008
Georgia was also a nation subjected to the aims of a cyber-attack.
However, different from the Estonian example, this attack coincided with the
Russian invasion of South Ossetia in August of 2008. According to Milikishvili,
this was the first time that a cyber-attack accompanied armed conflict (as cited
in Ashmore, 2009).

A denial of service attack claimed the website of the

Georgian president as well as other government sites (Ashmore, 2009).
Defacement of websites (including adding images of Adolf Hitler to web pages
associated with the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili) also occurred (as
cited in Ashmore, 2009).
In the case of Georgia’s informational infrastructure, its international
connectivity was far more limited than Estonia’s.

Also, most international

connectivity that was available was through Russian territory (Stapleton-Gray and
Woodcock, 2011).

Therefore, attempts to block outgoing messages including

media reports were easier. Compared to Estonia’s heavy reliance on Information
Technology infrastructure and e-commerce, Georgia was not nearly as engaged.
Stapleton-Gray and Woodcock mention an interesting occurrence of
outside entities “mirroring” Georgian web content in lieu of the cyber-attack.
This mirroring is symbolic of external support from governments (Poland, e.g.)
and corporations (Google, e.g.) sympathetic to the state’s duress (Stapleton-Gray
and Woodcock, 2011, Ashmore, 2009).
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Estonia sent Information Technology

security specialists from its own CERT to assist in combating the cyber-attacks
(Ashmore, 2009).
As with Estonia, there was no direct linkage between Russian government
involvement and the cyber-attacks. However, the cyber-attacks in Georgia and
Estonia, (as well as other attacks in Kyrgyzstan and Lithuania not analyzed here)
were initiated in response to hostility with Russia (as cited in Ashmore, 2009).
Whether there was some level of Russian involvement or not, Ashmore asserts,
“opposition to the Russian government could result in a cyber-attack which could
disrupt critical government infrastructure” (Ashmore, 2009). It is important to
note Shackelford’s assertion, “states remain the focus of containing IW
(information warfare) as the Estonia incident and the Russian-Georgian armed
conflict reveal more and more of a cyber dimension to international conflicts
(Shackelford, 2009).

If this trend continues, as many believe it will, the

implications of cyber-attacks among states will require closer examination.

Stuxnet
Shifting geographically from Eastern Europe to the Middle East we find
more evidence of cyber-warfare among states, although the evidence was not
nearly as clear initially. A worm, popularly known as “Stuxnet,” had infiltrated
the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz. Stuxnet has been found to have infected
over 60,000 computers, half of which were located in the Iranian state (Farwell
and Rohozinski, 2011). While that leaves other infections outside Iran, including
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India, China, the United States and Australia among others, Ralph Langner calls
Stuxnet, “an all-out cyber strike against the Iranian nuclear program” (Langner,
2010).
Stuxnet was a worm designed to infiltrate and establish control, as well as
change instructions in remote systems (Farwell and Rohozinski, 2011). A “zeroday attack,” Stuxnet used a penetration technique never before seen, aiming to
exploit a previously unknown weakness in software (Clarke and Knake, 2010).
In fact, the authors Clarke and Knake claim that the cyber-attack was made up
of four zero-day attack techniques, ostensibly in the event that a technique was
ineffective, it could try the next.
The challenge for the Stuxnet worm was that according to Farwell and
Rohozinski, the worm’s target was actually not connected to any public
infrastructure.

Therefore, the infection would require the use of an external

device, such as a USB memory stick.

Upon infection, Stuxnet used Siemens’

default passwords to find and acquire access to particular programs, called
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) (McMillan, 2010).

The PLCs at Natanz

were made by an Iranian company called Fararo Paya (Clarke and Knake, 2010).
This fact has important ramifications to be discussed later.
Also important are SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
systems. They are used to control large-scale industrial systems in factories,
power plants, military installations and others (McMillan, 2010). To simplify, the
SCADA system tells the machinery what to do and monitors its work. Stuxnet
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not only gained access, but it reprogrammed the SCADA systems. It then began
to manipulate the cycle drive speeds within gas centrifuges at Natanz, resulting
in rotor damage and in effect rendering the centrifuge useless (Langner, 2010).
Clarke and Knake claim that almost 1,000 centrifuges at the Natanz site were
removed as a result of the sabotage.
As mentioned earlier, the worm had spread beyond Iran, into other
nations. This was not by design. The worm was designed to search for Siemens
software running Fararo Paya PLCs (Clarke and Knake, 2010).

However, the

worm continued to look outside of this scope, for the Siemens software. If it did
not locate the software and PLC recipe, it continued on, infecting other networks
but remaining dormant.

As a result, the worm was now out in the open,

available for cyber-warriors and hackers around the world to analyze and break
down its complex code. Since it was never meant to get into the open, it truly
highlights the dangers of cyber operations.
Who would be potentially responsible for this cyber-attack? Clarke and
Knake note, “In June 2009, four Iranian organizations were infected. None of
the four were publicly known to be connected to Natanz, but the CIA or Mossad
knew they were” (Clarke and Knake, 2010). This infers American and Israeli
coordination, if not direct action. Kaspersky Lab researcher Roel Schouwenberg
agrees that this cyber-attack was most likely the work of a nation-state
(McMillan, 2010).

Sanger claims that President Barack Obama looked to

accelerate former President G.W. Bush’s aims to expand the United States’ use of
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cyber-weapons (Sanger, 2012). Sanger reports that interviews with current and
former American, European and Israeli officials involved confirmed American and
Israeli involvement. Allegations of American involvement in another cyber-attack
in the Middle East will be covered in the next section on “Flame”. Langner notes
that the attack was very sophisticated, requiring perhaps several years of
preparation.

This level of complexity was not believed possible at the time,

indicating professional handling. Considering the chilling alternative, Langner
states, “let’s just HOPE the US is the leading force behind Stuxnet” (Langner,
2010).

What Langner implies, is that if this level of complexity was not

generated by the United States, the alternative could be another nation-state, or
possibly a private hacking entity.

Flame
The previous case studies have alluded to cyber-attack potential for
control, disruption and destruction.

However, these need not be the only

capabilities for hacking into state resources.

It might befit a nation-state to

utilize cyber resources in ways that human intelligence may be unrealistic or
unprofitable. A great example of this scenario would be the computer virus now
known as “Flame.”
Flame was not designed to be destructive. Rather, its primary function
was espionage. Also known as Flamer and Skywiper, the primary infection was
deemed to be in Iran, though other Middle East nations reported infection. Later,
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infections spread among other nations. Experts believe the possibility exists that
travelers may have taken laptops abroad with the infection (Constantin, 2012).
The computers affected belonged to individuals, as well as educational
institutions and state-related organizations (Nakashima, 2012).
Compared to Stuxnet, researchers have deemed Flame to be related,
though approximately twenty times the size of Stuxnet (Nakashima, 2012) and
much more complex (Constantin, 2012). Written in a computer language called
LUA due to its stability (which is uncommon for most malware attacks), Flame
was designed to be hard to detect (Tsukayama, 2012). This insinuates that the
designers wished it to remain in an espionage capacity. Indeed, the infection
was only found two years after initial activation, after Iran’s Oil Ministry
discovered disruptions and investigated (Nakashima, Miller and Tate, 2012).
Schouwenberg notes that this is the first virus capable of using,
“Bluetooth wireless technology to send and receive commands and data” (as
cited in Nakashima, 2012). However, the primary method of infection was
copying itself to portable USB devices and through printer vulnerabilities
(Constantin, 2012). CrySys, a cryptography and security lab, claims that Flame
was capable of, “logging keystrokes, activating microphones to record
conversations and taking screenshots” (Nakashima, 2012).

Alexander Gostev

says, “Flame can easily be described as one of the most complex threats ever
discovered” (Gostev, 2012).
Researchers later found that Flame had also exploited Microsoft Windows
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Update on machines with Windows Operating Systems. The writers of Flame
had somehow stolen digital signatures of code which allowed the malicious code
to masquerade as code “approved by Microsoft.”

This means that the fully-

patched machines were infected by supposedly legitimate code. This prompted
Microsoft to issue an immediate fix just days after the initial reports of the cyberattack, rather than wait for the designated patch date (Keizer, 2012).
Initially, attribution was again challenging.

Gostev offers the following

analysis: “there are three known classes of players who develop malware and
spyware: hacktivists, cybercriminals and nation-states” (Gostev, 2012). Given
the complexity, hacktivism is not the likely source.

Further, the intention of

Flame was not to steal money from bank accounts, mitigating the possibility of
cybercriminal activity (Gostev, 2012). Finally, this complexity in addition to the
geographic focus of the attack (Iran, but also including Palestinian areas of
Israel, Sudan, Syria, among others) leaves the ostensible conclusion that Flame
was a tool used by nation-state(s) (Gostev, 2012).
Indeed, Kaspersky labs later surmised that specific computer code was
used in both Flame as well as the aforementioned Stuxnet.

Gostev claims,

“…conclusions point to the existence of two independent developer teams…”
though, “part of the code from the Flame platform was used in Stuxnet” (Gostev,
2012). The findings indicate that while two teams may have been independent,
some collaboration existed.
The Washington Post confirmed that the United States and Israel,

45

“…jointly

developed

a

sophisticated

(Nakashima, Miller and Tate, 2012).

computer

virus

nicknamed

Flame”

Further, “the massive piece of malware

secretly mapped and monitored Iran’s computer networks, sending back a steady
stream of intelligence to prepare for a cyber-warfare campaign” (Nakashima,
Miller and Tate, 2012). Based on this finding, it is reasonable to assume that
Flame actually predated Stuxnet. According to Schouwenberg, Flame allowed for
Stuxnet to sabotage Natanz based on Flame’s findings regarding networks
associated with the nuclear facilities (Nakashima, Miller and Tate, 2012). What
began as an espionage operation led to an intricate first-strike on Iranian nuclear
capability.

Evaluation of Cases
The cases highlight some basic aims of cyber-attacks: control, disruption,
destruction and espionage. All of the cases implicated nation-states, but it is
important to note that none of the cases were definitive in attributing the cyberattack to the suspected nation-state.

Both the Estonian and Georgian cases

include suspected Russian involvement or at least Russian support.

In both

cases where Iran was the target of cyber-attacks, suspicion falls on the United
States and Israel, with some media “insiders” alleging confirmation of the states’
involvement.

While some government officials and media point fingers, the

instigators of the cyber-attacks remain unidentified.

This finding has

repercussions for the question of attribution of cyber-attacks to be analyzed later
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in Chapter Five.
The other important issue evaluated in these cases was the question of
intended effects, as well as which entity or entities were to be affected. In both
the Estonian and Georgian cases, informational infrastructure was targeted. This
left not only government but civilian entities in a debilitated state for long periods
of time. In addition, the Georgian cyber-attack was accompanied by a military
incursion into Georgian territory, raising suspicions that the two operations were
related.

The Iranian cyber-attacks were both directed towards facilities

suspected of uranium enrichment; the end result of which may or may not have
been for military purposes. The issues surrounding these cases raise questions
of targeting combatants vs. non-combatants as well as directing attacks against
dual-use entities, which I also assess in Chapter Five.
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Chapter Five:
International Law and Its Applications to Cyberwar upon Nation-states
The dangers of cyberwar among states go beyond the daily inconvenience
that the common individual experiences every day. Viruses, worms and the like
have become so commonplace among computer users that most of the
population is aware of the dangers.

Most individuals have taken reasonable

measures to defend their property and capital from outside attack. Informed
users know that malware protection is available, and it is up to them to keep
their protection updated to keep up with the latest infections.

Malware

protection software companies are also hard at work to keep up with the
constant barrage of new malware as best as they can. Even with such effort,
there are challenges. The common individual does not have much of a say in the
national defenses of states. States must continue to protect their infrastructures
as well as communicate with fellow states within the international community.
Otherwise, domestic safeguards noted above are largely inadequate.

States

have a duty to protect and assist not only their own citizens but civilians
everywhere. International norms and agreements must exist that unequivocally
define cyber-attacks, related terms and the behaviors among states that are to
become customary in a cyber world. I argue these norms should go beyond the
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current application of jus in bello and include international law governing
cyberwar.

Comparison to Nuclear Weapons
Authors Damrosh, Henkin, Murphy and Smit describe international law as,
“concerned with law that principally operates among sovereign countries (or
‘states’), arising from sources such as treaties and the customary practice of
states” (Damrosch, Henkin, Murphy and Smit, 2009).

The authors note that,

“traditionally, international law was seen as the law of the international
community of states, the basic units in the world political system from the Peace
of Westphalia (1648) forward” (Ibid, 2009).
occurred following the First World War.

However, an important change
Malanczuk calls this “modern”

international law, concerning itself with an, “attempt to organize the international
community and to ban the use of force” (Malanczuk, 1997).
This ban on the use of force is found in Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter.

As a caveat, Article 51 provides for the right of states to collective and

individual self-defense against armed attacks (United Nations, 1945). The UN
Charter does not offer any guidance on the topic of cyberwar, however. This
makes sense, since the original UN Charter was created in 1945, well before this
issue came about.

Swanson definitively declares, “Currently, there is no

provision in international humanitarian law (IHL) or customary international law
(CIL) that explicitly outlaws cyber-warfare or computer network attacks, either
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carried out independently or during times of war (Swanson, 2010). However,
Swanson finds that international law has been capable of addressing warfare and
its changing dynamics and capabilities. “The Geneva Conventions, as well as the
international humanitarian law principles of proportionality and unnecessary
suffering, all provide a legal framework for addressing cyber-warfare issues
(Swanson, 2010).
It could be argued that cyber-weapons are similar to nuclear weapons.
Their unique capabilities and characteristics call for unique laws (Swanson,
2010). Shackelford points out that the cyber-attacks on Estonia, “like nuclear
warfare, do not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, nor do
they pass the test of proportionality” (Shackelford, 2009).

The International

Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled the threat or use of nuclear weapons, “would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law” (I.C.J.,
1996). The potential for disastrous consequences in a nuclear attack can be
matched in the case of an all-out attack using cyber-warfare. The example of a
cyber-attack where critical infrastructures are destroyed or otherwise rendered
useless can leave a state in a helpless position, causing unnecessary suffering to
its citizens.

If nuclear weapon use is subject to the rules of international

humanitarian law, so too should cyber-attacks (Shackelford, 2009).
Nuclear capability among major powers redefined the context of warfare
during the twentieth century. Once the world observed what nuclear weapons
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were capable of, it became evident that this technology was not to be taken
lightly. I would argue the same could be said for the use of cyberwar continuing
in the twenty-first century.

Except in this case, nuclear weapons are not as

readily available to the general population, whereas hacking capabilities can be
learned by anyone with the desire and talent. Furthermore, the world has not
yet seen the overwhelming potential of cyberwar on a grand scale, and therefore
this may not be taken as seriously unless a catastrophic cyberwar-like event were
to occur.

Shortcomings of Conventional Jus In Bello Application to Cyberwar
The Geneva Conventions place limits on conduct among war participants.

Jus in bello, the law of war, stipulate restraints placed on the extent of harm to
non-combatants.

Non-combatants have not forfeited the same rights that

soldiers have by entering military service.

Distinction between civilians (and

civilian entities) and combatants (and their entities) must exist.

Therefore,

military objectives should be the primary targets for an attack (U.N.T.S. Protocol
additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Additional Protocol I,
2009).
Protections afforded to civilians also encompass any objects that are
indispensable to the civilian population.

However, Hollis explains a challenge

inherent within cyberwar: “The irony of information operations (IO) is that the
less likely it is that a particular IO functions as an attack, the more likely it is that
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its use against civilians and their objects is permissible. In other words, IO’s
development may actually result in warfare having more impact on civilians by
expanding militaries’ ability to target (but not attack) them” (Hollis, 2007).
During conflict, any force must be met with a proportionate response.

For

example, an attack by Nation A at a military base in Nation B does not in and of
itself grant license to Nation B to use a cyber-attack to shut down an entire
portion of the national electrical infrastructure in Nation A. Such an escalated
response would inevitably affect multiple sectors, public and private, reliant on
electrical systems, including economic sectors, health sectors and public safety.
That violates not only the proportional aspect of current jus in bello, as well as
the non-combatant protections afforded by the Geneva Conventions.
Indeed, another aspect of the law of war allows for the military targeting
of “dual-use” entities.

For example, civilians working at a military munitions

factory are seen to be in a “dual-use” capacity.
qualify for military targeting.

As such, this facility would

This possibility exists for virtually all computer

networks. Hollis notes that as of 2000, 95% of U.S. military traffic went through
civilian telecommunication and computer systems (Hollis, 2007).

Under the

“dual-use” rule, any adversary could potentially attack any communication
system (if they are to be treated as military objectives), and they may be
targeted either using cyber-warfare OR conventional means.

Attempts to

interfere with military or government communications via the informational
infrastructure would also interfere with civilian use of the same infrastructure.
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Indeed, Schaap argues, “Cyber-warfare operations…create more opportunities
for targeting dual-use objects” (Schaap, 2009).
While the attempts to endorse a law of war have thus far been wellintended, it is clear that the usage of jus in bello to adequately cover the
complex intricacies of cyberwar is simplistic and naïve. Complications arise from
cyberwar and its humanitarian effects on the non-combatants of the targeted
state. This issue raises difficult questions, and does not even begin to satisfy
concerns regarding asymmetric uses of cyberwar between state and non-state
actors or including non-international areas and territories.

In short, current

international law is insufficient to address all complexities and circumstances
through which cyberwar may occur (Hollis, 2007).

The Challenge of Attribution
Shackelford claims that attribution of a cyber-attack to a state is the key
element in building a functioning international regime (Shackelford, 2010). While
some instances of government sponsored cyber-attack using transnational
networks can be traced to a nation-state, more typically these attacks are not
from official state action.
Two international standards exist that could offer guidance on the issue of
attribution. First, the doctrine of effective control establishes the understanding
of a state’s control over paramilitary groups and other non-state actors if the
actors act in “complete dependence” on that state (as cited in Shackelford,
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2010). Conversely, the operational control doctrine, found that where the state
has a role in coordinating on behalf of a particular group and offering support,
there is enough overall control to attribute a group’s actions to the supporting
state (as cited in Shackelford, 2010).
While the International Court of Justice has more often utilized the first
and more constricting interpretation, the doctrine of effective control, this may
not be feasible in the present context of cyber-attack. Nations may easily hide
behind the doctrine of effective control because of the challenges of attributing
cyber-attacks to any nation-state. Complete government control will be difficult
to establish in many cases.

However, if the second, more liberal doctrine of

operational control is used as the interpretation of cyber-attacks and their
attribution, any nation that simply coordinated and supported an attack would be
attributed. Using the Estonian case noted previously, the doctrine of operational
control interpretation would surely find Russian involvement to be adequate to
grant Estonia reparations (Shackelford, 2010).
The need for clarity on the question of attribution is of great importance,
as it may take many years of practice for customary international law to become
crystalized. However, even with a firmer establishment of attributive law, this
does not rectify the overall issue. Today’s sophisticated techniques allow for the
hacker to remain anonymous if they have the skillset. Worse, they may implicate
an otherwise innocent entity or nation-state. “If a cyber-attack disabled critical
infrastructure, or killed enough people, the United States could treat it as an act
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of war—and respond with force by invoking the right of self-defense—without
knowing for sure who launched the attack” (Hollis, 2011). Therefore, the most
hardened of efforts to attribute cyber-attacks to any one perpetrator or
perpetrators may end without success, or worse the false-positivity of success.

Future of Cyberwar Under Norms of Potential International Agreement
A future framework of norms that govern cyberwar must offer adequate
guidance to what is arguably one of the most complex, misunderstood and
potentially devastating issues the world faces today.

This challenge to

international security and peace is occurring at the present, and unfortunately
the international community is just starting to grasp what the issue entails. In
the fast-paced cyber-world, being reactive leaves one behind and vulnerable. A
proactive approach is needed on cyberwar to allow nation-states and their
domestic and international entities the opportunity to mitigate the potential
threats that are intrinsic within the growing cyber-world. Clear delineations of
norms must come to fruition, or risk confusion and potential chaos among states
in responses to cyber-attack.
The complexities and pitfalls of cyberwar call for new international
agreements on the matter. The current regimes that govern warfare will not
suffice.

The law of war was put in place to add a humanitarian element to

warfare, but in cyberwar, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is not as discernible. Non-combatants and the infrastructures that
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they use on a daily basis must be protected to avoid modern catastrophe.
Regional cooperatives have been created, such as the NATO Cyber
Defence Centre in Tallinn.

The, “NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of

Excellence (NATO CCD COE) was formally established on the 14th of May, 2008,
in order to enhance NATO’s cyber defence capability. Located in Tallinn, Estonia,
the Centre is an international effort that currently includes Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the Netherlands and
USA as Sponsoring Nations” (CCD DOE, 2012). Their mission is, “to enhance
the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations
and partners in cyber defence by virtue of education, research and development,
lessons learned and consultation” (CCD DOE, 2012).

The centre, located in

Estonia, where the cyber-attacks of 2007 occurred, is a reminder of what can be
accomplished as lessons are learned from difficult circumstances. Unfortunately,
it was these difficult circumstances that brought the issue to light.

The

international society of states must come to consensus on this matter, before
such disruption occurs. After all, it may not be a nation behind such attacks.
States wishing to protect themselves beyond their own cyber-protections
domestically should also come together diplomatically on this critical issue.
Perhaps an international regime similar to regional cooperatives such as the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre may be in order. “The fight against
cyber-terrorism, computer hacking and economic cyber deception has to be rated
as a common strategy for any national government in the Information Age and
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requires consecutive coordinated interaction between groups of national
governments” (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006).
Actions on the part of the international community during the Georgian
conflict as well as during the Estonian cyber-attack seem to indicate that
sympathetic nations are willing to help in times of crisis.

As noted previously,

during the Estonian affair, a call for help from the Estonian CERT went out
around the world.

During the Georgian crisis, sympathetic nations and

corporations came to Georgian aid, placing important information onto the
internet in lieu of the fact that Georgia was unable to do so. In addition, during
the cyber-attacks, Estonia had sent IT security specialists to aid in bringing
Georgia back online.

While customary international law may take time to

develop, there has been a historical basis for assisting ailing units during times of
dire need.

In fact, there is international law already in place that requires

assistance, if it has been reasonably requested by the party under duress and
the ability to help exists. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
may hold some analogous application to cyberwar.
Duty To Assist. Hollis points out the similarities between an SOS at sea
and the characteristics of cyber-attacks: “Strikingly, the three elements giving
rise to the SOS at sea – incapacity, severity and urgency – characterize
cyberthreats as well” (Hollis, 2011). Challenging cyber-attacks can, “overwhelm
the most sophisticated individuals, groups and even states” (Hollis, 2011). As
seen in Estonia and Georgia, the state became incapacitated under duress until
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the situation came under control, and outside assistance surely had a hand in
bringing the crises to their conclusion.
In terms of severity, Hollis argues that cyber-attacks have the potential for
systemic concerns, rather than simply localized consequences. While economic
effects may occur, the entire system may become erratic due to the inherent
entwined nature of many systems. Aggregated effects are felt throughout the
system, its users and potentially an entire nation. Indeed, infrastructures that
affect resource distribution, such as water and power systems can have real
consequences for life, beyond merely systems and economic factors.
The question of urgency should be addressed without doubt.

Cyber

threats can and do arise immediately. Sometimes, dormant threats exist, such
as logic bombs infused within informational infrastructures.

These potential

crises are waiting for the “go ahead,” and therefore can become urgent issues.
A duty to assist (DTA) paradigm should be incorporated into any
international regime governing the use of cyber-attacks. The previous question
of attribution becomes less prevalent under an international system where
professionals come to the aid of those under duress.

If norms existed that

elevated the need to mitigate harm, rather than attribute blame through a
collectively agreed upon duty to assist, attackers may be deterred from
attempting attacks in the first place.

This is particularly true if requests for

assistance come to a state that must aid against their own attack. The cyberattack on Estonia led them to request assistance from the Russian government to
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cut off DDoS attacks coming from its territory. In the case of the actual account,
Russia said it was not responsible and remained unhelpful. However, under the
DTA norm, Russia may not have the option of doing nothing, and might be
obligated by the international norm to assist.

Of course, states must agree

which threats are to be covered, who can legally request assistance and expect
it, who must provide the assistance and finally, what assistance must be granted
(Hollis, 2011).
The agreement must include clearly defined protocols on this matter, but
under the circumstances, nation-states have many reasons to agree on such an
idea. Hollis argues that the Internet has become indispensable. A shared and
vested interest in the Internet is realized, when one understands that everyone is
at risk, but at the same time, everyone can help (Hollis, 2011).

Individuals,

who learn that they are part of a botnet without realizing it, can disconnect from
it. In the cyber-world of extreme interconnectivity, every little effort helps, and
many times with instant results. Individual states can rely on their fellow states
to assist, as in the future, the reverse may be true and the latter may need
assistance from the former.
This whole area raises a pivotal question:

Should cyber-attacks be

outlawed in all situations? This universal ideal may be misguided, as states will
want to continue their tactics of cyber-espionage, and perhaps even cyberwarfare on military targets. However, any international norms governing cyberattack must be clear in what cyber-attacks are allowed under some sort of cyber-
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jus in bello standard that can be negotiated by states. Cyber threats that cause
unnecessary human suffering must continue to be outlawed as seen from the
perspective of international law.
While the international community may continue to operate under
auspices of shared interests in many cases, there still is the understanding that
international anarchy is still in place. States are individuals in an international
society with equal stature and equal resonance of opinion but there still is the
expectation that states may indeed flout decrees if they see it in their best
interest. However, under a set of international norms that governs cyberwar, a
nation that does not follow these norms would be a member that cannot be
trusted, and may find themselves isolated. Even so, I assert states will, in many
cases identify common ground and should come to agreement on this
international space known as the Internet, if it is in their best interest. With
most states using the same informational, interconnected infrastructure their
best interests lie in perpetuating its safety, until something else comes along to
replace the Internet. Until then, everyone is in the same vulnerable situation.
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Chapter Six:
Conclusion
Beidleman calls cyberspace, “the world’s nervous system; the control
system of modern society. Its protection is an international existential concern”
(Beidleman, 2011).

Such grand sentiment is echoed among users who have

come to rely on cyberspace to function daily.

Today’s globalizing climate

necessitates the use of cyberspace to communicate and grow.
cyberwar challenges future state and international security.

The issue of

Cyberwar as we

currently understand it has not had a very long existence, and yet its
metamorphosis through technological advancement has brought remarkable
strain to global proceedings.
After analyzing shortcomings of the realist and liberalist perspectives
towards international norms concerning cyberwar, and looking at the issue
through the lens of the English School perspective, I argue that this is not the
time for unilateralism. Instead, I assert that international consensus on the
question of cyberwar must come to fruition.

The English School perspective

offers an environment where an international society of states can perpetuate
regional and international cooperation in the face of dangers not understood until
recently. Customary international law may be too slow to respond to the fastpaced cyber-world. States must be proactive rather than reactive to the threats
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inherent in cyberspace. Those in the minority that believe that this issue does
not command immediate attention need only speak with those who have
experience in this arena. This is not meant to be a metaphorical “the sky is
falling” attitude, but to continue the metaphor, an umbrella would be handy, and
everyone should have access to one.
The case studies that are included have shown that states (as well as
capable individuals and other actors) can create an environment that leaves
those affected incapacitated and damaged.

The potential for international

consensus may be of comfort, but this consensus must be clear and address the
multitude of complexities and dangers intrinsic to the issues of cyberwar.

I

recommend that newly formed norms perhaps codified in treaties might offer the
international community some clarity and agreement among its members.
Similar to the nuclear threat faced by those in the twentieth century, a new
regime of international law needs to be sanctioned and enacted in order to begin
to regulate cyberwar in the twenty-first century and beyond. To do less is to
invite cyber-disaster.
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Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms and Terms
Botnet: A network of Internet-connected end-user computing devices infected
with bot malware, which are remotely controlled by third parties for nefarious
purposes. A botnet is under the control of a given "botherder" or "botmaster." A
botnet might have just a handful of botted hosts, or millions (U.S. Federal
Communications Commission, 2012).
Computer Network Attack (CNA): Actions taken through the use of
computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves
(Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012).
Cyber-attack (CyA): CyA actions combine Computer Network Attack (CNA)
with other enabling capabilities (such as, EA, physical attack and others) to deny
or manipulate information and/or infrastructure (U.S. Army TRADOC Pam 525-78, 2010).
Cyber-terrorism:
Premeditated, politically motivated attack against
information, computer systems, computer programmes, and data, which result in
violence against noncombatant targets (Azarov and Dodonov, 2006).
Cyberspace: A global domain within the information environment consisting of
the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including
the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers (Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012).
Cyberwar: Actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers
or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption (Clarke and Knake,
2010).
Defense Information Infrastructure (DII): The shared or interconnected
system of computers, communications, data applications, security, people,
training, and other support structures serving Department of Defense (DOD)
local, national, and worldwide information needs. The defense information
infrastructure connects DOD mission support, command and control, and
intelligence computers through voice, telecommunications, imagery, video, and
multimedia services.
It provides information processing and services to
subscribers over the Defense Information Systems Network and includes
command and control, tactical, intelligence, and commercial communications
systems used to transmit DOD information (Department of Defense Joint
Publication 1-02, 2012).
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Denial of Service Attack (DoS): The prevention of authorized access to
resources or the delaying of time-critical operations (U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004).
Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS): Same as Denial of Service
attacks, but on a grand scale using Botnets or Worms to spread the attack.
Global Information Infrastructure (GII): The worldwide interconnection of
communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that
make vast amounts of information available to users. The global information
infrastructure encompasses a wide range of equipment, including cameras,
scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines, computers, switches, compact disks,
video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, fiber optic transmission lines,
networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and much more. The
friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and handle the transmitted
information constitute a critical component of the global information
infrastructure (Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012).
Information Operations (IO): The integrated employment, during military
operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp the decision-making of
adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (Department of
Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012).
Information Security (INFOSEC): The protection of information and
information systems against unauthorized access or modification of information,
whether in storage, processing, or transit, and against denial of service to
authorized users (Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012).
Information System (IS): The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel,
and components for the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display,
dissemination, and disposition of information (Department of Defense Joint
Publication 1-02, 2012).
Intrusion Detection System (IDS): Intrusion detection is the process of
monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing
them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of
violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard
security practices. Incidents have many causes, such as malware (e.g., worms,
spyware), attackers gaining unauthorized access to systems from the Internet,
and authorized users of systems who misuse their privileges or attempt to gain
additional privileges for which they are not authorized (U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007).

73

Intrusion Detection and Protection System (IDPS): An intrusion detection
system (IDS) is software that automates the intrusion detection process (U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2007).
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS): An intrusion prevention system (IPS) is
software that has all the capabilities of an intrusion detection system and can
also attempt to stop possible incidents (U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2007).
Logic Bombs: In programming, a form of sabotage in which a programmer
inserts code that causes the program to perform a destructive action when some
triggering event occurs. (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004).
Malware: Malware is a category of malicious code that includes viruses, worms,
and Trojan horses (Symantec, 2012).
National Information Infrastructure (NII): The nationwide interconnection
of communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics
that make vast amounts of information available to users. The national
information infrastructure encompasses a wide range of equipment, including
cameras, scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines, computers, switches,
compact disks, video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, fiber optic
transmission lines, networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and
much more. The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and
handle the transmitted information constitute a critical component of the national
information infrastructure (Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02, 2012).
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC): A programmable microprocessorbased device that is used in discrete manufacturing to control assembly lines and
machinery on the shop floor as well as many other types of mechanical, electrical
and electronic equipment in a plant (The Computer Language Company, 2012).
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA): Software for
networks of devices that control the operation of a system of machines such as
valves, pumps, generators, transformers and robotic arms. SCADA software
collects information about the condition of and activities on a system. SCADA
software sends unencrypted instructions to devices, often to do physical
movements. Instructions sent to devices on SCADA networks are sometimes
sent over the Internet or broadcast via radio waves (Clarke and Knake, 2010).
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP): The format
used to divide information such as emails into digital “packets” each with its own
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to and from data so that the packet can be routed on the internet (Clarke and
Knake, 2010).
Trojan Horse: Computer program that conceals harmful code. A Trojan horse
usually masquerades as a useful program that a user would wish to execute
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004).
Virus: A program that ‘infects’ computer files, usually executable programs, by
inserting a copy of itself into the file. These copies are usually executed when
the ‘infected’ file is loaded into memory, allowing the virus to infect other files
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004).
Worm: Independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself from
one system to another across a network (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004).
Zero-Day Vulnerability: Zero-day vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities against
which no vendor has released a patch. The absence of a patch for a zero-day
vulnerability presents a threat to organizations and consumers alike, because in
many cases these threats can evade purely signature-based detection until a
patch is released. The unexpected nature of zero-day threats is a serious
concern, especially because they may be used in targeted attacks and in the
propagation of malicious code (Symantec, 2012).
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